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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 In 1965, Congress amended the Social Security Act to 
create a program for states to assist the poor with their medical 
expenses.  Through this program, known as Medicaid, the fifty 
states pay medical expenses on behalf of qualified beneficiaries.  
For more than thirty years, in circumstances where third parties are 
liable for such medical expenses, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Public Welfare (DPW) has recouped its expenditures by asserting 
liens against future settlements or judgments.  In Arkansas 
Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 
268, 280 n.9, 291-92 (2006), the Supreme Court assumed without 
deciding that such liens, when limited to the portion of a settlement 
or judgment constituting reimbursement for medical costs, are an 
implied exception to the federal law prohibiting states from 
imposing liens on the property of Medicaid beneficiaries.  We now 
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must decide whether these liens in fact constitute such an 
exception. 
I 
 
 This appeal involves a putative class action filed by three 
Pennsylvania Medicaid beneficiaries subject to DPW liens.  The 
District Court certified a question for interlocutory review pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), asking us to determine whether state 
agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have 
the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania‘s 
statutory framework is consistent with the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Ahlborn. 
 
 We begin by reviewing the facts of the state court cases 
filed by each of the three plaintiffs (collectively, the Beneficiaries). 
 
A 
 
1 
 
 Rita L. Tristani underwent a bunionectomy in 1999 that 
resulted in pain and discoloration in her leg.  Her surgeon 
suspected that she was suffering from deep venous thrombosis, and 
immediately referred her to the hospital.  Upon her arrival, Tristani 
was examined by a medical resident who misdiagnosed her 
condition as superficial thrombophlebitis.  Roughly one week after 
the misdiagnosis, Tristani suffered a massive pulmonary embolism 
and stroke, which left her partially paralyzed, disfigured, and 
brain-damaged.  Consequently, Tristani resides in a facility where 
she receives full-time medical care. 
 
 Tristani was eligible for assistance under Pennsylvania‘s 
Medicaid program, and the DPW—the state agency responsible for 
administering Medicaid—paid for her medical care.  In September 
2001, Tristani filed a medical malpractice action in which she 
sought, inter alia, the costs of medical expenses that had been paid 
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on her behalf by the DPW.  Approximately two months after the 
complaint was filed, the DPW wrote Tristani‘s counsel that, as a 
recipient of medical assistance, Tristani had assigned her right to 
recover medical expenses to the DPW.  In May 2002, Tristani 
preliminarily settled her malpractice claim for $5.2 million.  
Thereafter, seeking to recoup funds it had expended for Tristani‘s 
medical care, the DPW sent Tristani‘s counsel another letter 
asserting a lien of $247,514.98 against her settlement.  The agency 
later reduced this lien by 40% to $148,508.99 to bear its 
proportionate share of Tristani‘s contingency fee obligation to her 
counsel.  On June 2, 2005, the state trial court issued an order 
directing payment of the DPW‘s lien in full. 
 
2 
 
 In January 2005, Joshua Valenta was injured in a traffic 
accident and suffered relatively minor, but permanent injuries.  
Valenta was eligible for government assistance, and the DPW paid 
$15,539.61 for his medical expenses.
1
  Following his accident, 
Valenta sued the tortfeasor, whose insurance carrier settled the 
case for $130,000.  In April 2005, the DPW sent Valenta‘s attorney 
a letter informing him that, as counsel for a Medicaid recipient in a 
                                                 
1
 Unlike Tristani, Valenta was enrolled in a managed 
care organization (MCO) that contracts with Pennsylvania to 
provide medical assistance.  Pursuant to that contractual 
arrangement, the MCO receives a monthly capitation fee for 
each enrolled member, in exchange for which the MCO pays 
health service providers for the cost of the member‘s medical 
care.  Although Valenta was enrolled in an MCO, the DPW 
paid the bulk of his medical fees directly.  In addition to these 
direct payments, the DPW also paid the MCO $1,001.90 in 
capitation fees on Valenta‘s behalf, and the MCO ultimately 
disbursed $42.35 in connection with his injuries. 
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third-party liability tort action, Pennsylvania law required him to 
satisfy the DPW‘s claim prior to making a distribution to his client.  
In August 2005, the DPW sent another letter asserting a lien for 
$15,581.56 against Valenta‘s settlement, which it reduced to 
$10,000 to account for attorneys‘ fees.  Valenta‘s attorney 
promptly mailed the DPW a check for $10,000 to satisfy the lien. 
 
 
 
3 
 
 A.H. is a young girl who suffered brain injuries following 
surgery to correct a congenital heart defect.  The DPW enrolled 
A.H. in an MCO and paid capitation fees totaling $25,095.91 on 
her behalf.  The MCO‘s payments to A.H.‘s health care providers 
totaled $171,617.18.  The DPW also paid $1,458.10 on a fee-for-
service basis for A.H.‘s benefit.  In June 2005, A.H. filed a medical 
malpractice claim against her doctors, which was settled in April 
2007 for an undisclosed amount.  After the settlement, the DPW 
asserted a lien for $106,306.88 to reflect the cost of her medical 
care, less attorneys‘ fees and pro-rata costs.  A.H. challenged the 
validity of the DPW‘s lien, and, instead of paying the lien directly, 
A.H.‘s mother obtained court approval to place the disputed funds 
in an escrow account pending the outcome of this litigation.
2
 
                                                 
2
  In addition to challenging the validity of the DPW‘s 
liens generally, A.H. asserts that the DPW‘s practice of 
recouping the cost of medical care exceeding the capitation 
fees it paid is impermissible. The District Court order did not 
address whether the DPW is limited to recouping the amount 
it paid in capitation fees, or if it could instead seek 
reimbursement for the full amount of medical payments 
expended by the MCO.  Because this issue was not addressed 
below, we decline to address it in this interlocutory appeal. 
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B 
 
 In May 2006, Tristani and Valenta commenced a putative 
class action in the District Court against: Estelle B. Richman, 
Pennsylvania‘s Secretary of Public Welfare; Feather Houston, 
Richman‘s predecessor; and the DPW.  Tristani and Valenta 
sought a refund of their payments to the DPW, as well as 
declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating Medicaid liens 
generally.  They argued that the DPW‘s claims were prohibited by 
the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Social Security 
Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)-(b).  Alternatively, they asserted 
that Pennsylvania‘s scheme for recouping medical expenses from 
Medicaid recipients was impermissible under the Supreme Court‘s 
holding in Ahlborn.
3
 
                                                 
3
  In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court reviewed an 
Arkansas law that permitted the imposition of liens on 
recoveries made by Medicaid beneficiaries against third 
parties.  Pursuant to the Arkansas statute, the state could 
impose a lien in an amount equal to the medical assistance 
payments made on behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries, without 
regard to what portion of the settlement related to medical 
costs.  The Court assumed without deciding that liens limited 
to medical costs are an implied exception to the federal law 
prohibiting liens on the property of Medicaid beneficiaries.  
Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 284-85 (―To the extent that the forced 
assignment is expressly authorized by the terms of §§ 
1396a(a)(25) and 1396k(a), it is an exception to the anti-lien 
provision. . . . [T]he exception carved out by §§ 1396a(a)(25) 
and 1396k(a) is limited to payments for medical care.‖) 
(internal citation omitted).  The Court held that, because the 
Arkansas statute permitted the State to lien portions of the 
recovery not relating to medical costs, it was preempted by 
 8 
 
 
 Several months after Tristani and Valenta commenced their 
action, Richman and Houston (collectively, the Secretaries) filed a 
motion to dismiss.  Following two amendments to the complaint, 
the Secretaries again filed a motion to dismiss and, after oral 
argument, the District Court denied their motion without prejudice. 
In April 2008, Richman and Houston filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  The next day, Tristani and Valenta filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment in which they sought a 
declaration that: (1) Pennsylvania‘s practice of asserting Medicaid 
liens is invalid; (2) the DPW‘s ability to recover medical payments 
made by MCOs is limited to the capitation payments made by the 
State; and (3) Pennsylvania‘s current method of determining the 
portion of a settlement that constitutes medical costs violates the 
Supreme Court‘s holding in Ahlborn. 
 
 The District Court issued a comprehensive opinion denying 
Tristani and Valenta‘s motion for partial summary judgment and 
granting in part and denying in part the Secretaries‘ motion.  The 
District Court determined that federal law prohibits the DPW from 
asserting liens against third-party recoveries obtained by Medicaid 
beneficiaries.  Nevertheless, the District Court denied Tristani‘s 
and Valenta‘s claims for monetary damages, holding that the 
Secretaries were entitled to qualified immunity.  The District Court 
also held that Pennsylvania‘s practice of apportioning settlements 
between medical costs and other portions of the recovery was 
permissible under Ahlborn.  The Court denied the Secretaries‘ 
motion for summary judgment as to Tristani‘s and Valenta‘s 
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, but noted an 
unresolved issue regarding their standing to seek equitable relief. 
 
 After the District Court issued its order, the parties filed a 
joint motion to add a party to cure the potential standing problem.  
                                                                                                             
the federal ban on placing liens on the property of Medicaid 
beneficiaries. 
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The Court permitted the parties to add A.H. who, both parties 
agreed, had standing with respect to the remaining issues.  The 
District Court thus amended its prior order to deny the Secretaries‘ 
motion for summary judgment with regard to the validity of 62 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 1409(b)(7)—Pennsylvania‘s statutory mechanism 
for attaching liens to recoveries made by Medicaid beneficiaries—
and granted the parties‘ motion to certify an interlocutory appeal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
 
II 
 
 Although the parties agree that we have jurisdiction over 
this interlocutory appeal, we ―have an independent obligation to 
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the 
absence of a challenge from any party.‖  Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 
546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (internal citation omitted).  The District 
Court had jurisdiction over the Beneficiaries‘ federal claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and exercised supplemental 
jurisdiction over their state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(a). 
 
 The District Court certified an interlocutory appeal to this 
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which provides: 
 
[w]hen a district judge, in making in a civil action 
an order not otherwise appealable under this 
section, shall be of the opinion that such order 
involves a controlling question of law as to which 
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion 
and that an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. 
The Court of Appeals which would have 
jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may 
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be 
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taken from such order, if application is made to it 
within ten days after the entry of the order . . . . 
 
Consistent with the requirements of § 1292(b), the Secretaries 
timely petitioned this Court for leave to appeal.  After we granted 
the Secretaries‘ petition for interlocutory appeal, the Beneficiaries 
filed a notice of cross-appeal in the District Court. 
 
 The first issue we must confront with respect to our 
jurisdiction is whether the Secretaries have standing to appeal the 
order of the District Court.  ―The general rule is that a party may 
not appeal a favorable decision.‖  Ryan v. C.I.R., 680 F.2d 324, 
325 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Elec. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts 
Co., 307 U.S. 241, 242 (1939)).  Here, although the District Court 
held that the Medicaid liens asserted by the DPW were 
impermissible, it ultimately concluded that Richman and Houston 
were entitled to qualified immunity.  Thus, the Secretaries 
prevailed on this issue in the District Court.  Cf. Horne v. 
Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that when a 
District Court makes an adverse constitutional holding followed by 
a determination that qualified immunity exists, appellate review of 
the constitutional decision may be precluded for lack of standing). 
 
 After issuing its opinion, however, the District Court 
permitted the parties to add A.H. to the litigation to ensure that the 
Beneficiaries would have standing to pursue declaratory and 
injunctive relief.  Following the addition of A.H., and prior to 
certifying this interlocutory appeal, the District Court amended its 
order to deny the Secretaries‘ motion for summary judgment with 
respect to the validity of the Pennsylvania law permitting Medicaid 
liens.  This issue was included in the District Court‘s certification 
for interlocutory appeal, and constitutes an adverse judgment from 
which the Secretaries may properly seek appellate review.
4
 
                                                 
4
 We also note that the Supreme Court has held that 
―[i]n an appropriate case, appeal may be permitted from an 
 11 
 
 Having decided that we possess jurisdiction over the 
Secretaries‘ appeal, we must now determine whether we have 
jurisdiction over the Beneficiaries‘ cross-appeal.  Although they 
filed a notice of cross-appeal in the District Court, the 
Beneficiaries failed to petition for leave to appeal in this Court.  
We must decide whether this omission deprives us of jurisdiction 
over the issues raised in their cross-appeal.  Stated differently, 
when an appellant has timely sought and received leave to appeal, 
is a cross-appellant obligated to separately seek permission to 
appeal?
5
 
                                                                                                             
adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the merits at the 
behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits, so long as 
that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the 
requirements of Art[icle] III.‖  Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, 
Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 334 (1980).  To the 
extent the Secretaries otherwise lack standing, we hold that 
their continuing interest in the outcome of this litigation, 
combined with the importance of the District Court‘s 
collateral determination regarding the validity of the 
Pennsylvania law, makes this an appropriate case for 
appellate review. 
 
5
 The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Tenth 
Circuits have held that § 1292(b) requires a separate cross-
application for leave to file a cross-appeal.  See Tranello v. 
Frey, 962 F.2d 244, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1992); United Transp. 
Union Local 1745 v. City of Albuquerque, 178 F.3d 1109, 
1114 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding no jurisdiction under § 
1292(b), but exercising pendent appellate jurisdiction); cf. 
Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(recognizing the tension between the filing requirements of 
Rule 5 and the jurisdiction granted by § 1292(b), but avoiding 
the problem by declining to engage in discretionary review). 
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 In Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 
205 (1996), the Supreme Court explained: ―[a]s the text of § 
1292(b) indicates, appellate jurisdiction applies to the order 
certified to the court of appeals . . . . [Therefore,] the appellate 
court may address any issue fairly included within the certified 
order.‖  Accordingly, when we granted the Secretaries‘ petition for 
leave to appeal pursuant to § 1292(b), we obtained jurisdiction 
over the entire certified order of the District Court, including any 
portions that were decided in the appellant‘s favor.  See United 
Transp. Union Local 1745 v. City of Albuquerque, 178 F.3d 1109, 
1122 (10th
 
Cir. 1999) (Briscoe, J., concurring and dissenting).  
Thus, to the extent that the issues raised in the Beneficiaries‘ cross-
appeal were included in the certified order of the District Court, 
they are properly before us on appeal.
6
 
                                                                                                             
 
We note that both the Second and Tenth Circuits based 
their analyses in part on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
5(b), which governs appeals by permission, and provides that 
a cross-petition for leave to file a cross-appeal may be filed 
within 10 days after the initial petition is served.  At the time 
these cases were decided, it was understood that Rule 5 was 
jurisdictional.  More recently, however, the Supreme Court 
has clarified that non-statutory rules of procedure cannot be 
regarded as jurisdictional because ―[o]nly Congress may 
determine a lower federal court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction.‖  
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-56 (2004). 
 
6
  Our holding with respect to our jurisdiction under § 
1292(b) should not be understood to imply that cross-appeals may 
be omitted with impunity.  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
5(b)(2) requires a putative § 1292(b) cross-appellant to file a cross 
application ―within 10 days after the [initial] petition is served.‖  
Because Rule 5(b)(2) is not jurisdictional, however, it must be 
raised by a party.  See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-56 
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III 
 We exercise plenary review over an order resolving cross-
motions for summary judgment.  Cantor v. Perelman, 414 F.3d 
430, 435 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).  In determining whether summary 
judgment is appropriate, we apply the same standard as the District 
Court.  Bucks Cnty. Dep’t of Mental Health/Mental Retardation v. 
Pennsylvania, 379 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 2004).  Summary judgment 
should be granted when ―the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.‖  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 
IV 
 
A 
 
 Having established that jurisdiction lies, we proceed to the 
principal substantive issue, namely, the lawfulness of the DPW‘s 
practice of imposing liens on judgments or settlements that 
Medicaid beneficiaries obtain from third parties.  We begin with an 
overview of the applicable statutory provisions. 
 
The Social Security Act provides that, as a condition to 
receiving Medicaid assistance, states must require individuals ―to 
assign [to] the State any rights . . . to support . . . and to payment 
for medical care [the individual has] from any third party.‖  42 
                                                                                                             
(holding that court-adopted claim processing rule ―can . . . be 
forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the 
point‖).  In this appeal, the Secretaries have forfeited their Rule 
5(b)(2) argument.  Although they make a one-line reference to the 
impropriety of the Beneficiaries‘ cross appeal in a footnote to their 
opening brief, and again in a footnote to their reply brief, they also 
concede that we have ―discretion‖ to consider issues presented by 
the Beneficiaries in their cross-appeal. 
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U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1)(A).  The Act also requires states to ―ascertain 
the legal liability of third parties . . . to pay for care and services 
under the plan‖ and, ―in any case where such a legal liability is 
found to exist after medical assistance has been made . . . [, to] 
seek reimbursement . . . to the extent of such legal liability.‖  Id. § 
1396a(a)(25)(A)-(B). 
 
However, and of significance to this appeal, the Act also 
provides: 
 
No lien may be imposed against the property of any 
individual prior to his death on account of medical 
assistance paid or to be paid on his behalf under the 
State plan, except– 
 
(A)  pursuant to the judgment of a court on 
account of benefits incorrectly paid on 
behalf of such individual, or 
 
(B)  in the case of the real property of an 
individual–[who is in a nursing home and 
required by law to spend his own income on 
those expenses, and who cannot reasonably 
be expected to return home.] 
 
Id. at § 1396p(a)(1).  This is known as the ―anti-lien‖ provision. 
 
Of equal importance, the Act provides that ―[n]o 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on 
behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except 
[in limited circumstances not at issue in this case].‖  Id. at § 
1396p(b)(1).  This is known as the ―anti-recovery‖ provision. 
 
B 
 
 15 
 
 Pennsylvania has enacted a detailed statutory framework in 
an attempt to comply with the requirements of the Social Security 
Act.  Consistent with the federal mandate, 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 
1404(b) provides that ―[t]he acceptance of medical assistance 
benefits shall operate as an assignment to [the DPW], by operation 
of law, of the assistance recipient‘s rights . . . to payment for 
medical care from any third party.‖ 
 
 Although a Medicaid beneficiary must assign the portion of 
her recovery relating to medical costs to the State, Pennsylvania‘s 
statutory framework provides the beneficiary with a number of 
options for prosecuting the remainder of her claim against a third 
party.  For example, after providing notice to the DPW, a Medicaid 
beneficiary may elect not to include medical costs as damages in 
her lawsuit against a third party.  See 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 
1409(b)(5).
7
  If the beneficiary chooses not to include medical 
costs as part of her damages, the State will not be involved in the 
prosecution of her claim. 
 
 When a Medicaid beneficiary chooses to pursue damages 
for medical costs, however, the method of transferring this portion 
of the recovery to the State will vary depending on whether the 
State is involved in the lawsuit.  If the action is prosecuted by the 
Medicaid beneficiary alone, after the payment of litigation 
expenses and attorneys‘ fees, ―the court or agency shall allocate 
the judgment or award between the medical portion and other 
damages and shall allow [the DPW] a first lien against the medical 
portion of the judgment or award, [in the] amount of [the DPW‘s] 
expenditures for the benefit of the beneficiary under the medical 
                                                 
7
 Although § 1409(b)(5) was not enacted until 2008, it 
is relevant because the Beneficiaries seek declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
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assistance program.‖  Id. § 1409.1(b)(1).8  By contrast, if the claim 
is prosecuted jointly by the beneficiary and the DPW, after 
payment of litigation expenses and attorneys‘ fees, ―the court or 
agency shall allocate the judgment or award between the medical 
portion and other damages and shall make an award to [the DPW] 
out of the medical portion of the judgment or award [in] the 
amount of [the] benefits paid on behalf of the beneficiary under the 
medical assistance program.‖  Id. § 1409.1(b)(2). 
 
C 
 
 The Beneficiaries claim the DPW‘s practice of asserting 
liens on recoveries made by Medicaid recipients violates the anti-
lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Social Security Act.  
Despite having assigned to Pennsylvania the portion of their 
recovery relating to medical costs, the Beneficiaries claim they 
retain a property interest in their choses in action, including their 
claims for medical expenses.  Thus, they claim that § 
1409.1(b)(1)—which permits Pennsylvania to take a lien on the 
portion of a settlement that constitutes medical costs—effectively 
authorizes the imposition of a lien on a Medicaid beneficiary‘s 
property in violation of federal law.  The DPW counters that its 
liens fall within an exception to the federal prohibitions on 
                                                 
8
 Section 1409.1 was enacted in response to the Supreme 
Court‘s decision in Ahlborn, to permit settlements or judgments 
that include Medicaid and non-Medicaid components to be 
apportioned between the two items of recovery.  In all respects 
relevant to the imposition of liens at issue here, it is identical to § 
1409(b)(7), which was in force before Ahlborn and which remains 
valid law except as modified by § 1409.1‘s apportionment 
provisions.  See 62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1409(b)(7) (―[T]he court . . .  
shall . . . allow as a first lien against the amount of such judgment 
or award, the amount of the expenditures for the benefit of the 
beneficiary under the medical assistance program.‖). 
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imposing liens on the property of Medicaid beneficiaries and on 
recovering medical assistance payments made on their behalf.  The 
DPW further asserts that the Supreme Court‘s decision in Ahlborn, 
in which the Court assumed without deciding that such an 
exception exists, demonstrates that its liens are valid. 
 The District Court held that the Pennsylvania statute 
authorizing Medicaid liens was preempted by federal law.  The 
District Court recognized the tension between the plain language 
of the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Social Security 
Act, which prohibit states from recouping medical assistance 
payments made on behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries, and the forced 
assignment and reimbursement provisions of the Act, which 
require states to recover medical assistance payments made on 
behalf of beneficiaries.  Relying on dicta in the Ahlborn decision, 
the District Court determined that Medicaid beneficiaries, despite 
having assigned their recovery of medical costs to the State, retain 
an enduring property interest in this portion of their recovery.  See 
Tristani v. Richman, 609 F. Supp. 2d 423, 480 (W.D. Pa. 2009) 
(―Since Pennsylvania law permitted Tristani and Valenta to 
recover the entire amounts of their damages (including the 
amounts of payments made by the DPW to provide them with 
medical assistance), the entire settlement awards were their 
‗property.‘‖ (citing Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 285)).  The District Court 
then attempted to harmonize the conflicting provisions of the 
Social Security Act by interpreting them to require Pennsylvania to 
take an active role in the recovery of medical costs, either by 
intervening in lawsuits initiated by Medicaid beneficiaries or by 
directly pursuing liable third parties.
9
  Based on this approach, the 
                                                 
9
   Like the District Court, our dissenting colleague 
suggests that the language of the Social Security Act implies 
that ―Congress wanted states to initiate suits against or 
intervene in actions against liable third parties, and wanted 
Medicaid recipients to cooperate in those efforts by providing 
state agencies with any information they might require.‖  
 18 
 
District Court held that § 1409.1(b)(1) is preempted by the anti-
lien provision.  As we shall explain, we are unpersuaded by the 
District Court‘s analysis.10 
                                                                                                             
Dissent Typescript at 7.  Although it is true that § 
1396a(a)(25)(A) speaks of ―pursuing claims against . . . third 
parties,‖ we note that § 1396a(a)(25)(A) addresses only the 
duty of the state or local agency ―to ascertain the legal 
liability of third parties‖ whereas § 1396a(a)(25)(B), which 
discusses what must be done once a third party is deemed 
liable, provides only that ―the State or local agency will seek 
reimbursement . . . to the extent of such legal liability.‖  The 
absence of the phrase ―against . . . third parties‖ from the 
portion of the statute that directs states to seek reimbursement 
is telling. 
 
10
  To date, no federal appellate court has ruled on the 
validity of Medicaid liens limited to medical costs.  
Numerous district courts and state appellate courts, however, 
have assumed that such liens are valid in the wake of 
Ahlborn.  See, e.g., Armstrong v. Cansler, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 
2010 WL 2629740 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (endorsing the use of 
Medicaid liens limited to the portion of a settlement 
attributable to medical costs as consistent with Ahlborn); 
State v. Peters, 946 A.2d 1231 (Conn. 2008) (concluding that 
federal law does not prohibit the use of liens for recouping 
medical expenses); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 
452 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (permitting the use of 
Medicaid liens limited to the portion of a recovery 
attributable to medical costs); Lima v. Vouis, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
183 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (upholding the use of Medicaid liens 
to recover medical expenses after Ahlborn, but requiring the 
trial court to determine what portion of a settlement 
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constitutes payment for medical expenses); Russell v. Agency 
for Health Care Admin., 23 So. 3d 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010) (permitting the use of Medicaid liens to reimburse the 
State for medical costs); Dep’t of Health and Welfare v. 
Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905 (Idaho 2008) (holding that liens on 
medical costs are an exception to the anti-lien provision); 
Weaver v. Malinda, 980 So. 2d 55 (La. Ct. App. 2008) 
(permitting the State to take a Medicaid lien limited to the 
portion of a settlement allocated to medical expenses); 
Andrews v. Haygood, 669 S.E. 2d 310 (N.C. 2008) 
(permitting the use of liens to recover Medicaid expenses 
limited to medical costs); Edwards v. Ardent Health Servs., --
- P.3d ---, 2010 WL 4276067 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) 
(upholding the use of Medicaid liens limited to the portion of 
a recovery attributable to medical costs); E.D.B. v. Clair, 987 
A.2d 681 (Pa. 2009) (acknowledging that Ahlborn‘s holding 
invalidated the Arkansas law while permitting Pennsylvania‘s 
DPW to place liens on the medical expenses of Medicaid 
recipients). 
 
Although these decisions have permitted the use of 
Medicaid liens limited to medical costs, the majority of them 
have not clearly articulated their rationale for doing so.  
Indeed, some courts appear to be under the misapprehension 
that the Supreme Court held such liens to be permissible in 
Ahlborn.  See, e.g., In re Matey, 213 P.3d 389, 394 (Idaho 
2009) (―[A] state may not seek reimbursement from damages 
awarded for lost earnings, lost household services, non-
economic injury and the like because, according to the 
Supreme Court, those damages are the property of the 
Medicaid recipient.  However, the Supreme Court specifically 
stated that damages received for medical care did not 
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D 
 
 ―Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and 
where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, ‗that 
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.‘‖  Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (quoting 
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 
102, 108 (1980)).  As outlined above, the Social Security Act 
requires states to ―seek reimbursement‖ for medical assistance 
payments made on behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries whenever 
―legal liability [of a third party] is found to exist.‖  42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(25)(B).  Notably, this provision is silent regarding the 
method by which reimbursement must be sought.  The Act also 
states that, as a condition to eligibility, Medicaid beneficiaries 
must assign to the state any right they may have to recover medical 
costs from a third party.  The difficulty we perceive in this case is 
that the plain language of these provisions conflicts with the 
equally plain prohibition against states imposing ―liens . . . against 
the property of‖ Medicaid beneficiaries, 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(a)(1)(A), or ―recover[ing] . . . any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of an individual,‖ id. § 1396p(b)(1).  The 
initial question, therefore, is whether the plain language of these 
provisions can be reconciled. 
 
 The District Court attempted to resolve the apparent 
conflict by interpreting the Act to require intervention by the 
states.  However, the Court did not adequately explain, nor is it 
apparent to us, how its holding is consistent with the anti-recovery 
provision, which prohibits states from seeking ―adjustment or 
recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State [medical assistance] plan.‖  Id.  By its 
terms, the anti-recovery provision limits the ability of states to 
recover medical assistance payments made on behalf of Medicaid 
                                                                                                             
constitute property subject to the anti-lien provisions.‖) 
(citing Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 284). 
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beneficiaries, regardless of the specific collection method utilized.  
Thus, the District Court‘s conclusion that Pennsylvania must 
intervene in tort actions filed by Medicaid beneficiaries cannot be 
reconciled with the anti-recovery provision. 
 
E 
 
 The Supreme Court has stated that ―[w]hen ‗interpreting a 
statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in 
which general words may be used, but will take in connection with 
it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law, as 
indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a 
construction as will carry into execution the will of the 
legislature.‘‖  Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) 
(quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857)).  When we 
consider the Social Security Act as a whole, including its text, 
structure, purpose, and legislative history, we conclude that the 
DPW‘s practice of asserting liens against that portion of a 
Medicaid beneficiary‘s recovery relating to medical costs must be 
viewed as an exception to the anti-lien and anti-recovery 
provisions. 
 
The anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions significantly 
predate the reimbursement and forced assignment provisions.  As 
we shall explain, Congress was pursuing different goals in enacting 
these two sets of provisions.  While the anti-lien and anti-recovery 
provisions were intended to ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries 
were not forced to directly bear the costs of their medical care, the 
reimbursement and forced assignment provisions were intended to 
allow states to recoup their expenditures for medical assistance 
payments when third parties are held liable.  By allowing states to 
recover these expenditures, Congress both protected the public fisc 
and ensured that beneficiaries did not receive a windfall by 
recovering medical expenses they did not pay.  In order to 
effectuate the goals animating these conflicting provisions, we 
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must view the reimbursement and forced assignment provisions as 
exceptions to the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions.
11
 
1 
 
An examination of the Social Security Act reveals that 
Congress has consistently pursued the dual goals of protecting the 
personal property of Medicaid beneficiaries while ensuring that 
liable third parties reimburse states for Medicaid expenditures.  As 
we shall describe below, the Act‘s evolution over time reveals that 
Congress has not viewed these objectives to be in conflict.  Rather, 
the available evidence indicates that Congress did not intend that 
liens for medical costs would fall within the scope of the anti-lien 
and anti-recovery provisions. 
 
The anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions were first 
incorporated into the Social Security Act in 1960, some five years 
before Medicaid came into being.  They required state medical 
assistance plans for the aged to: 
 
                                                 
11
  This analysis is entirely consistent with the 
Supreme Court‘s holding in Ahlborn.  The purpose of the 
anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions was to ensure that 
Medicaid beneficiaries would not bear the burden of their 
medical costs during their lifetimes.  Consequently, to the 
extent that a settlement or judgment paid by a third party does 
not pertain to medical costs, the state has no recourse to those 
funds.  As the reimbursement and forced assignment 
provisions make clear, however, the portion of a settlement or 
judgment that does relate to medical costs properly belongs to 
the state.  To hold to the contrary would be to provide 
Medicaid beneficiaries with a windfall in direct contravention 
of the congressional mandate that states recoup the costs of 
medical assistance from liable third parties. 
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provide that no lien may be imposed against the 
property of any individual prior to his death on 
account of medical assistance for the aged paid or to 
be paid on his behalf under the plan (except 
pursuant to the judgment of a court on account of 
benefits incorrectly paid on behalf of such 
individual), and that there shall be no adjustment or 
recovery (except, after the death of such individual 
and his surviving spouse, if any, from such 
individual‘s estate) of any medical assistance for the 
aged correctly paid on behalf of such individual 
under the plan. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(11)(E) (Supp. II 1959-1961).
12
  By its terms, 
this provision creates a system in which elderly recipients of 
                                                 
12
  In 1962, the language of § 302 was duplicated in 42 
U.S.C. § 1382(a)(15)(D), a provision governing state plans 
for aid to the aged, blind, or disabled.  See Pub. L. 87-543, tit. 
I, § 141(a), 76 Stat. 172, 197 (1962).  Discussion during 
hearings before the Senate indicates that the purpose of the 
provision was to protect the homes of blind recipients of aid.  
See An Act to Extend and Improve the Public Assistance and 
Child Welfare Services Programs of the Social Security Act, 
and for Other Purposes: Hearings Before the Comm. on 
Finance of the S., 87th Cong. 362 (1962) (statement of John 
F. Nagle, Chief, Washington Office, National Federation of 
the Blind) (―State laws which require an applicant for blind 
aid to accept a lien on his property before he will be granted 
assistance, serve to convince the applicant–as nothing else 
can–of the full extent of his pauperized state. . . . A lien is 
such a restriction upon property and its free use that, although 
a home may represent a lifetime of thrift and denial, it is not 
available for use to the blind owner who wishes to make a 
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new start in life.‖).  In 1965, largely the same language was 
included in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18), a provision governing 
federal grants to states for medical assistance programs.  See 
Pub. L. 89-97, tit. I, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 344 (1965); cf. S. 
REP. No. 89-404, at 80 (1965) reprinted in 1965 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2020 (stating that pursuant to § 1396a 
―adjustment or recovery would be made only at a time when 
there is no surviving child who is under the age of 21 or who 
is blind or permanently disabled‖). 
 
These three anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions 
remained in place until 1982, when Congress consolidated 
them into 42 U.S.C. § 1396p.  See Pub. L. 97-248, tit. I. § 
132(b), 96 Stat. 324, 370 (1982).  Section 1396p actually 
broadened the authority of states to seek reimbursement from 
Medicaid beneficiaries by allowing them, in certain 
circumstances, to impose liens on the homes of beneficiaries 
during their lifetimes.  See S. REP. No. 97-530, at 437 (1982) 
(―States are allowed to impose liens on real property 
including the home, of institutionalized [M]edicaid 
beneficiaries who the State determines, after notice and 
opportunity for a hearing, are reasonably likely to remain in a 
nursing home for the remainder of their lives.‖).  Section 
1396p remains in force today, and has undergone numerous 
amendments adjusting the exact circumstances under which 
states may recover from Medicaid beneficiaries.  For 
purposes of our analysis, however, the various iterations of 
the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions are irrelevant.  Our 
focus is on the fact that the provisions have been in force 
since 1960, have been repeatedly re-enacted, and have 
consistently been animated by a legislative intent to insulate 
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medical assistance are insulated from paying the costs of their care 
during their lifetimes and the lifetimes of their surviving spouses.  
Nevertheless, this system, which ultimately allows a state to 
recoup its medical assistance expenditures directly from the estate 
of a deceased beneficiary, in no way entitles beneficiaries to retain 
monies paid to them by liable third parties in compensation for 
their medical costs. 
 
The legislative history of the anti-lien and anti-recovery 
provisions confirms this understanding.
13
  As a Senate Report 
discussing the provision stated, pursuant to the congressional 
framework ―[a] State would not be permitted as a condition of 
medical assistance to impose a lien on the property of a recipient 
during [her] lifetime. . . .  However, the bill would permit the 
recovery from an individual‘s estate after the death of [her] spouse 
if one survives [her].‖  S. REP. No. 86-1856, at 6 (1960), reprinted 
in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3608, 3615.  The report then explains that 
―[t]his provision was inserted in order to protect the individual and 
[her] spouse from the loss of their property, usually the home, 
during their lifetime.‖  Id.  Congress‘s concern for protecting a 
                                                                                                             
Medicaid beneficiaries from the costs of their medical 
expenses, and, in particular, to protect the family home. 
 
13
  The Supreme Court has instructed that ―where . . . 
resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and 
the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory 
language and then to the legislative history if the statutory 
language is unclear.‖  Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 
(1984).  As we explained supra, the plain language of the 
forced assignment and reimbursement provisions of the 
Social Security Act irreconcilably conflicts with that of the 
anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions.  Accordingly, recourse 
to legislative history is necessary here. 
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Medicaid beneficiary‘s personal assets—not her interest in 
recovering medical costs paid on her behalf—clearly animated the 
enactment of the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions.  Moreover, 
a beneficiary‘s property interest in her home is readily 
distinguishable from the inchoate interest that she retains in her 
chose in action, particularly since Congress has mandated 
assignment of that chose to the state.
14
  We cannot agree that 
Congress intended these provisions to prohibit states from placing 
liens on recoveries from liable third parties, especially in light of 
the reimbursement and forced assignment provisions it later added 
to the Social Security Act. 
 
 The reimbursement provision of the Act was first enacted 
in 1967, and required state medical assistance plans to provide: 
 
(A) that the State or local agency administering 
such plan will take all reasonable measures to 
ascertain the legal liability of third parties to pay for 
care and services (available under the plan) arising 
out of injury, disease, or disability, (B) that where 
the State or local agency knows that a third party 
has such a legal liability such agency will treat such 
legal liability as a resource of the individual on 
whose behalf the care and services are made 
available for [purposes of determining a potential 
recipient‘s eligibility for medical assistance] . . . 
[and] that in any case where such a legal liability is 
                                                 
14
  We need not decide whether Medicaid beneficiaries 
have more than a nominal property interest in the portion of 
recoveries from third parties attributable to medical costs.  
Whatever the extent of that property interest, it is sharply 
curtailed by the forced assignment provision, which requires 
potential Medicaid beneficiaries to assign this interest to the 
state as a condition of eligibility. 
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found to exist after medical assistance has been 
made available on behalf of the individual, the State 
or local agency will seek reimbursement for such 
assistance to the extent of such legal liability. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (Supp. III v.2 1965-1968).  The plain 
language of this provision requires states to consider third-party 
liability when making Medicaid eligibility determinations, and to 
seek reimbursement of sums expended when third-party liability is 
unknown at the time payments are made.  In this way, the 
reimbursement provision protects the public fisc while preventing 
Medicaid beneficiaries from receiving a windfall.  Although the 
anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions were in force when the 
reimbursement provision was enacted, Congress made no attempt 
to reconcile this new requirement with the prohibition against 
states recovering medical assistance payments made on behalf of 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  Instead, the statute simply requires states 
to consider any known third-party liability as an asset of the 
individual in determining eligibility, and to seek reimbursement 
when liability is discovered after medical assistance payments have 
been made.
15
  
 
 The legislative history of the reimbursement provision 
confirms that Congress intended to ensure that states recover 
                                                 
15
  The reimbursement provision permits states to deny 
Medicaid benefits outright when third-party liability is known 
at the time Medicaid eligibility is determined and to recover 
their outlays when third-party liability is later discovered.  
Thus, although the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions 
protect the assets of the Medicaid beneficiary, the 
reimbursement provision demonstrates that Congress did not 
believe that individuals should be entitled to have their 
medical expenses paid twice. 
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medical assistance payments made on behalf of Medicaid 
beneficiaries whenever third parties are found liable for medical 
expenses.  As stated during a Senate hearing: 
 
Unquestionably, many beneficiaries will be paid 
twice through receipt of benefits under the 
[M]edicaid program, and from obligations imposed 
upon the insurance industry by the liability system.  
To the extent that the [Medicaid] program is 
intended to assist the medically indigent, it is not 
consistent to apply [M]edicaid benefits to those 
whose needs are being met by a third party under a 
legal or contractual obligation.  To the extent that 
health care protection is being provided from 
sources other than under the social security 
program, the resulting duplication is discriminatory 
and a wasteful, inefficient use[] of public funds. 
 
Social Security Amendments of 1967: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. On Finance, 90th Cong. 1572 (1967) (statement of Wallace 
M. Smith). 
 
 The forced assignment provision of the Social Security Act 
was first enacted in 1977.  As a condition of receiving Medicaid 
benefits, the forced assignment provision obligates states to require 
individuals 
 
to assign the State any rights, of the individual or of 
any other person who is eligible for medical 
assistance under this title and on whose behalf the 
individual has the legal authority to execute an 
assignment of such rights, to support (specified as 
support for the purpose of medical care by a court 
or administrative order) and to payment for medical 
care from any third party. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a)(1)(A).  By its terms, this provision requires 
individuals, as a condition of receiving Medicaid benefits, to 
confer upon the state their right to recover the costs of their 
medical care.  This is further evidence of congressional intent to 
ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries do not receive a windfall by 
recovering medical costs they did not pay. 
 
Our review of the evolution of the various provisions of the 
Social Security Act reveals that the only way to harmonize the 
conflicting language of the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions 
with the later-enacted reimbursement and forced assignment 
provisions is to conclude that the anti-lien and anti-recovery 
provisions do not apply to medical costs recoverable from liable 
third parties.  The anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions evince 
congressional intent to protect the assets of Medicaid recipients, 
and to ensure that beneficiaries are not forced to personally bear 
the costs of their medical care.  Meanwhile, the reimbursement and 
forced assignment provisions require states to recover the costs of 
medical assistance payments despite the apparent prohibition 
against seeking recovery of medical assistance payments.  It defies 
common sense to conclude that Congress intended to protect the 
rights of Medicaid beneficiaries to recover medical costs that they 
never paid in the first place.  Indeed, federal law requires 
beneficiaries to assign their right to recover such medical costs to 
the state, because it is the state—not the beneficiaries—that pays 
these costs. 
 
2 
Our conclusion that liens on medical costs are excepted 
from the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions is bolstered by the 
forced assignment provision.  The District Court viewed the forced 
assignment provision as evidence of congressional intent to require 
states to intervene in lawsuits initiated by Medicaid beneficiaries 
against third parties.  We see it differently. 
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 As the Secretaries correctly point out, a partial assignment 
typically creates a lien on a portion of the recovery in favor of the 
assignee.  See, e.g., Matchett v. Wold, 818 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 
1987) (―An ordinary lien attaches to property in being; the 
statutory attorney‘s lien attaches to an expectation [of recovery], 
the court thought the statute better described therefore as making 
the attorney in effect a partial assignee of his client‘s interest in the 
lawsuit . . . .‖); Angeles Real Estate Co. v. Kerxton, 737 F.2d 416, 
419 (4th Cir. 1984) (―[U]nder general common law principles, a 
partial assignment creates an equitable lien in favor of the 
assignee.‖); Law Research Serv., Inc. v. Martin Lutz Appellate 
Printers, Inc., 498 F.2d 836, 837 (2d Cir. 1974) (―[T]he 
assignment of [part of] an existing right [under a judgment] creates 
an immediate lien in favor of the assignee that is valid against later 
lien creditors of the assignor.‖).  We do not believe that Congress 
would prohibit states from imposing liens to recoup medical costs 
while at the same time imposing a requirement that has the legal 
effect of creating such liens.  The more logical conclusion is that 
Congress understood that the legal effect of the forced assignment 
provision would be to provide the states with a lien on recoveries 
of medical costs.  Thus, in our view, the forced assignment 
provision is evidence of Congress‘s intent to except recoveries of 
medical assistance payments whenever third parties are found 
liable for them. 
 Unlike the District Court, we do not believe that Congress 
intended to require states to intervene in Medicaid beneficiaries‘ 
lawsuits in order to recoup medical costs from third parties.  
Congress enacted the forced assignment provision more than a 
decade after it began requiring states to ―seek reimbursement‖ for 
medical costs from liable third parties.  The purpose of the 
provision was to ensure that states were able to recoup their 
outlays.  Thus, far from restricting the state‘s ability to recoup 
medical expenses, the forced assignment provision was intended to 
facilitate the state‘s recovery of those funds. 
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 Finally, practical considerations weigh in favor of our 
holding today.  At present, over thirty states use liens to recoup 
medical expenses paid on behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries from 
liable third parties.  See State v. Peters, 946 A.2d 1231, 1239 n.19 
(Conn. 2008).  And disparate federal and state courts have 
overwhelmingly endorsed this practice.  See supra note 9.  In 
Pennsylvania, the authority for imposing such liens dates back to 
1980.  See 1980 Pa. Laws 510 (―After payment of . . . expenses 
and attorneys‘ fees the court or agency shall, on the application of 
the department, allow as a first lien against the amount of such 
judgment or award, the amount of the department‘s expenditures 
for the benefit of the beneficiary under the medical assistance 
program . . . .‖).  Since then, Congress has had occasion to amend 
the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions, and has chosen not to 
prohibit this widespread and pervasive practice.  Its failure to do so 
further supports our holding that Medicaid medical expense liens 
are excepted from the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions.  See 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (―Congress is 
presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation 
of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a 
statute without change.‖). 
3 
 
The text of the Social Security Act, when combined with its 
structure, purpose, and legislative history, reveals that Congress 
sought to accomplish different goals in enacting the anti-lien and 
anti-recovery provisions on the one hand, and the reimbursement 
and forced assignment provisions on the other hand.  While the 
anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions were intended to protect the 
assets of Medicaid recipients, the subsequently-enacted forced 
assignment and reimbursement provisions were intended to limit 
the financial burden of Medicaid on the states and ensure that 
Medicaid beneficiaries did not receive a windfall by recovering 
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medical costs they did not pay.
16
  In this context, the forced 
assignment and reimbursement provisions are best viewed as 
creating an implied exception to the anti-lien and anti-recovery 
provisions of the Act.  Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that 
the statutory mechanism created by Congress for beneficiaries to 
relinquish their right to recover medical assistance payments to the 
state—a partial assignment—itself creates a lien.  Consequently, 
we hold that liens on settlements or judgments limited to medical 
costs are not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery 
provisions of the Social Security Act. 
 
IV 
 
A 
 
 Having determined that liens limited to recoveries for 
medical costs are not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery 
provisions, we now turn to Pennsylvania‘s method of apportioning 
settlements between medical costs and the remainder of a 
beneficiary‘s recovery.  Typically, a Medicaid beneficiary‘s 
recovery from a third party will compensate her for a variety of 
damages, including medical costs, lost wages and pain and 
suffering.  Pursuant to the Supreme Court‘s holding in Ahlborn, 
states may be reimbursed only for the portion of the recovery 
constituting compensation for medical expenses.  Many 
settlements, however—including those at issue in this appeal—are 
not specifically apportioned between medical costs and other types 
of damages.  The question before us is how, in the absence of 
                                                 
16
   Although the Dissent shares our concern in this 
respect, it argues that any windfall to Medicaid beneficiaries 
can be avoided by precluding beneficiaries from claiming 
amounts paid by Medicaid in their suits against third parties.  
We are unpersuaded by this approach because it would result 
in a windfall to tortfeasors. 
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explicit allocation, one may ascertain what portion of a settlement 
is allocable to medical expenses recoverable by the state. 
 
 Pennsylvania has addressed this allocation problem by 
providing: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this act, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
entire amount of any settlement of the injured 
beneficiary‘s action or claim, with or without suit, is 
subject to the department‘s claim for reimbursement 
of the benefits provided any lien filed pursuant 
thereto, but in no event shall the department‘s claim 
exceed one-half of the beneficiary‘s recovery after 
deducting for attorney‘s fees, litigation costs, and 
medical expenses relating to the injury paid for by 
the beneficiary. 
 
62 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1409(b)(11).  As the District Court noted, the 
DPW has construed this provision as ―‗establish[ing] a statutory 
default rule of allocation for tort recoveries consistent with 
Ahlborn.‘‖  Tristani v. Richman, 609 F. Supp. 2d 423, 464 (W.D. 
Pa. 2009) (quoting 37 Pa. Bull. 4881, 4228 (Sept. 8, 2007)).  
Pursuant to the DPW‘s construction of section 1409(b)(11), in the 
absence of a judicial allocation of damages, the DPW is entitled to 
recover the lesser of its actual expenditures on medical costs or one 
half of the beneficiary‘s recovery after expenses. 
 
 In this appeal, the Beneficiaries‘ medical costs constitute 
less than one-half of their recoveries; therefore, the DPW has 
recovered (or, in A.H.‘s case, seeks to recover) the full amount of 
its Medicaid expenditures, less a pro rata reduction for attorneys‘ 
fees and costs.  The Beneficiaries argue, however, that they settled 
their claims for less than full value, and that the DPW‘s recovery 
for medical costs should be reduced correspondingly.  Because no 
such reduction occurred, the Beneficiaries claim that the DPW‘s 
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liens exceed the scope of the interests they assigned to the agency 
in violation of Ahlborn. 
 
B 
 
 The District Court rejected the Beneficiaries‘ argument, 
concluding that Pennsylvania law validly adopted a default 
apportionment mechanism to divide settlements between medical 
costs and other expenses.  The District Court noted that although 
section 1409(b)(11) predates Ahlborn, thereafter the DPW has 
interpreted it as establishing a default apportionment between non-
medical and medical expenses.  This interpretation has since been 
codified in 55 PA. CODE § 259.2, which states: 
(b)  In determining the portion of a tort recovery 
that represents payment for medical care by a third 
party, the Department will apply the following 
interpretations: 
 
. . . . 
 
(2)  In the absence of a court order 
allocating tort proceeds among categories of 
damages, ½ of the net proceeds are allocated 
by law to be available to repay injury-related 
[Medicaid] expenses.  The amount of net 
proceeds is computed by deducting from the 
gross proceeds the attorney‘s fees, litigation 
costs and medical expenses relating to the 
injury that were paid for by the beneficiary 
prior to the settlement of the injured 
beneficiary‘s action or claim. 
 
. . . . 
 
(5)  The Department is not bound by a 
private agreement between the parties to a 
 35 
 
tort claim regarding allocation of the 
proceeds. 
 
(d)  If a court does not adjudicate the amount of the 
Department‘s claim against a settlement, the Bureau 
of Hearings and Appeals has jurisdiction to hear and 
determine an appeal by a beneficiary contesting the 
amount of the Department‘s claim. 
 
This regulation explains section 1409(b)(11)‘s relationship to the 
rule of Ahlborn, and formally establishes a default method for 
establishing the portion of a recovery relating to medical costs.
17
 
 
 The District Court found this scheme to be consistent with 
federal law.  The Court noted that Ahlborn recognized the 
possibility that plaintiffs would manipulate settlement agreements 
to artificially depress the portion attributable to medical expenses.  
In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court suggested that this risk could ―be 
avoided either by obtaining the State‘s advance agreement to an 
allocation or, if necessary, by submitting the matter to a court for 
decision.‖  Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 288.  In a footnote, the Court 
stated: 
 
[s]ome States have adopted special rules and 
procedures for allocating tort settlements in 
                                                 
17
  We note that, with the exception of subsection (d), 
which permits a beneficiary to appeal the default allocation of 
his recovery, this regulation is identical to the law in force 
prior to the Ahlborn decision.  Because the Beneficiaries‘ 
claims predate the regulation, there is some uncertainty as to 
whether they may avail themselves of the regulatory appeal 
process.  The parties agree, however, that to date the DPW 
has not engaged in any individualized apportionment of the 
Beneficiaries‘ settlements. 
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circumstances where, for example, private insurers‘ 
rights to recovery are at issue.  Although we express 
no view on the matter, we leave open the possibility 
that such rules and procedures might be employed 
to meet concerns about settlement manipulation. 
 
Id. at n.18.  The District Court held that Pennsylvania‘s 50% 
allocation and agency appeal provisions are ―special rules and 
procedures‖ of this kind that are consistent with the federal 
requirement that the State‘s recovery not exceed the portion of the 
third-party recovery attributable to Medicaid-paid expenses.  The 
Supreme Courts of North Carolina and Idaho have reached similar 
conclusions with respect to analogous state laws.  See State Dep’t 
of Health & Welfare v. Hudelson, 196 P.3d 905, 911 (Idaho 2008); 
Andrews ex rel. Andrews v. Haygood, 669 S.E. 2d 310, 314 (N.C. 
2008). 
 
 Alternatively, the District Court held that Pennsylvania‘s 
apportionment scheme is valid because, under Pennsylvania law, a 
settlement represents full compensation for an individual‘s 
damages, which implies that the Beneficiaries cannot, after 
settling, claim that they were not made whole.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, ―when a subrogor settles a claim, he essentially 
waives his right to a judicial determination of his losses, and 
therefore conclusively establishes the settlement amount as full 
compensation for his damages.‖  Goldman v. Workers’ Comp. 
Appeal Bd. (Girard Provision Co.), 620 A.2d 550, 552 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1993).  ―Hence, in effect, [Pennsylvania] law 
indicates that when an individual settles his suit he is later 
estopped from claiming that his damages exceed the amount 
settled for.‖  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 527 A.2d 1021, 1025 n.4 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never 
explicitly adopted this rule, but as the cases quoted above 
demonstrate, it has gained some traction in the lower courts.  
Accordingly, the District Court held that, even in the absence of 
the statutory default allocation, the ―made whole‖ doctrine would 
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fix the portion of the Beneficiaries‘ settlement attributable to 
Medicaid expenses at an amount equal to the DPW‘s actual 
expenditures. 
 
 We agree with the District Court‘s conclusion that 
Pennsylvania‘s apportionment scheme is valid.  Pursuant to the 
current statutory framework, beneficiaries unhappy with its results 
may appeal the default allocation.  This mechanism is consistent 
with the Supreme Court‘s holding in Ahlborn, and comports with 
the practice of other states.  Therefore, we will affirm this portion 
of the District Court‘s order.18 
 
C 
 
 Despite the validity of Pennsylvania‘s current 
apportionment scheme, the question remains whether the prior 
scheme, which did not provide a right of appeal from the default 
allocation, is valid under Ahlborn.
19
  The District Court upheld the 
scheme, but we find it problematic. 
 
                                                 
18
  Because we uphold Pennsylvania‘s framework, we 
do not reach the merits of the District Court‘s alternative 
holding premised on the ―made whole‖ doctrine. 
 
19
  Tristani‘s and Valenta‘s claims regarding the 
validity of the apportionment scheme are moot because the 
District Court correctly determined that any recovery on their 
part is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of 
qualified immunity.  A.H., however, challenged the validity 
of the DPW‘s lien prior to making a payment. Moreover, the 
DPW asserted its lien before section 1409 was amended.  
A.H. therefore has a viable claim for declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
 38 
 
Although the Ahlborn Court acknowledged the existence in 
state law of ―special rules and procedures‖ for allocating 
settlements, and left open the possibility that such rules may be 
employed to address concerns about settlement manipulation, 547 
U.S. at 288 n.18, it did not give states unfettered discretion to 
allocate settlements without regard to the actual portion 
attributable to medical expenses.  Indeed, Ahlborn expressed a 
preference for resolving allocation disputes ―either by obtaining 
the State‘s advance agreement to an allocation or, if necessary, by 
submitting the matter to a court for decision.‖  Id. at 288. 
We express no view as to whether allocation disputes of 
this type must be adjudicated by a court, or may instead be 
resolved through other ―special rules and procedures.‖  Id. at 288 
n.18.  We hold merely that in determining what portion of a 
Medicaid beneficiary‘s third-party recovery it may claim in 
reimbursement for Medicaid expenses, the state must have in place 
procedures that allow a dissatisfied beneficiary to challenge the 
default allocation.  As the Beneficiaries point out, without such a 
rule nothing would prevent states from allocating 75%, 90% or 
even 100% of a settlement to medical expenses, thereby 
eviscerating the rule promulgated by Ahlborn.  Because the District 
Court concluded otherwise, we will reverse its order in this respect 
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
V 
 
 In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court assumed without deciding 
that liens on recoveries made by Medicaid beneficiaries for 
medical costs constitute an exception to the anti-lien and anti-
recovery provisions of the Social Security Act.  Medicaid 
beneficiaries in Pennsylvania have questioned this assumption by 
challenging the State‘s practice of utilizing such liens.  Our 
examination of the text, structure, history and purpose of the Social 
Security Act leads us to conclude that liens limited to medical 
costs are not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery 
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provisions of the Act.  Accordingly, we uphold Pennsylvania‘s 
longstanding practice of imposing such liens. 
 
 The Beneficiaries have also challenged Pennsylvania‘s 
practice of disaggregating medical costs to comport with the 
requirements of Ahlborn.  We hold that Pennsylvania‘s current 
statutory framework, which affords Medicaid recipients a right of 
appeal from the default allocation, is a permissible default 
apportionment scheme.  The prior framework, which did not afford 
beneficiaries a right of appeal, is invalid under Ahlborn. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate in 
part, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
1 
 
Tristani v. Richman, Nos. 09-3537, 09-3538, Consolidated 
POLLAK, District Judge, dissenting. 
 
I. 
 
 I agree with the majority that we possess jurisdiction 
over the defendants‘ appeal, and that we possess jurisdiction 
over the issues raised in the plaintiffs‘ cross-appeal to the 
extent those issues were included in the certified order of the 
District Court.  However, like the District Court, I do not 
believe Congress intended to permit state Medicaid agencies, 
such as the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare 
(―DPW‖), to impose liens on judgments and settlements 
obtained by Medicaid beneficiaries from third parties.
1
  I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
  
                                                          
 1 As the majority recognizes, the Supreme Court‘s 
decision in Arkansas Department of Health and Human 
Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 280 n.9 (2006), assumed 
without deciding that ―a State can . . . requir[e] an 
‗assignment‘ of part of, or plac[e] a lien on, the settlement 
that a Medicaid recipient procures on her own.‖  After 
making this assumption, the Court cited to §§ 
1396k(a)(1)(B)–(C) with a ―cf.‖ signal, noting in a 
parenthesis that under those provisions a Medicaid ―recipient 
has a duty to identify liable third parties and to ‗provid[e] 
information to assist the State in pursuing‘ those parties.‖  Id. 
(emphasis and alteration in original).  As will be discussed 
below, the language emphasized by the Court undercuts the 
majority‘s construction of the Social Security Act.   
2 
 
II. 
A. 
 As a condition of participating in Medicaid, states 
must prepare a state Medicaid plan to comply with various 
requirements set out in the Social Security Act.  See generally 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a.   As relevant here, a state Medicaid plan 
must permit the state to seek ―reimbursement‖ when third 
parties are liable for medical services provided by Medicaid.  
Specifically, the plan must provide: 
(A)  that the State or local agency 
administering such plan will take all 
reasonable measures to ascertain the 
legal liability of third parties . . . to pay 
for care and services available under the 
plan, including  
(i) the collection of sufficient 
information . . . to enable the 
State to pursue claims against 
such third parties, . . .  
(ii) the submission to the Secretary of 
a plan (subject to approval by the 
Secretary) for pursuing claims 
against such third parties . . . ; 
(B)  that in any case where such a legal 
liability is found to exist after medical 
assistance has been made available on 
behalf of the individual and where the 
amount of reimbursement the State can 
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reasonably expect to recover exceeds the 
costs of such recovery, the State or local 
agency will seek reimbursement for such 
assistance to the extent of such legal 
liability; . . . . 
Id. §1396a(a)(25)(A)-(B) (emphasis added) (―reimbursement‖ 
provision). 
 A state‘s Medicaid plan must also require individuals 
enrolled in Medicaid to assign to the state their right to 
payment for medical care from third parties, and to cooperate 
with the state‘s efforts to recover those payments.   In 
relevant part, this ―assignment/cooperation‖ provision states 
that: 
(a)  For the purpose of assisting in the 
collection of medical support payments 
and other payments for medical care 
owed to recipients of medical assistance 
under the State plan approved under this 
subchapter, a State plan for medical 
assistance shall 
(1)  provide that, as a condition of 
eligibility for medical assistance 
under the State plan to an 
individual who has the legal 
capacity to execute an assignment 
for himself, the individual is 
required  
(A)  to assign the State any 
rights . . . to support 
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(specified as support for 
the purpose of medical care 
by a court or administrative 
order) and to payment for 
medical care from any 
third party;  
(B)  to cooperate with the State 
. . . in obtaining support 
and payments (described in 
subparagraph (A)) for 
himself . . . ; and  
(C)  to cooperate with the State 
in identifying, and 
providing information to 
assist the State in 
pursuing, any third party 
who may be liable to pay 
for care and services 
available under the plan . .  
(b)  Such part of any amount collected by the 
State under an assignment made under 
the provisions of this section shall be 
retained by the State as is necessary to 
reimburse it for medical assistance 
payments made on behalf of an 
individual with respect to whom such 
assignment was executed . . . and the 
remainder of such amount collected 
shall be paid to such individual. 
5 
 
Id. § 1396k(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
2
 
In addition to the reimbursement and 
assignment/cooperation provisions, the Social Security Act 
contains an ―anti-lien‖ provision, which states that: 
No lien may be imposed against the property of 
any individual prior to his death on account of 
medical assistance paid or to be paid on his 
behalf under the State plan, except 
 
                                                          
 2  Similarly, a state‘s Medicaid plan must ensure that 
the state has in place a legal framework by which the state 
acquires the right to payment from third parties for medical 
expenditures made by Medicaid.  That is, the plan must 
provide: 
 
that to the extent that payment has been made 
under the State plan for medical assistance in 
any case where a third party has a legal liability 
to make payment for such assistance, the State 
has in effect laws under which, to the extent that 
payment has been made under the State plan for 
medical assistance for health care items or 
services furnished to an individual, the State is 
considered to have acquired the rights of such 
individual to payment by any other party for 
such health care items or services . . . . 
 
Id. § 1396a(a)(25)(H). 
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(A)  pursuant to the judgment of a 
court on account of benefits 
incorrectly paid on behalf of such 
individual, or  
(B)  in the case of the real property of 
an individual [when the individual 
is an inpatient in a medical 
institution, is required to spend 
her own income as a condition of 
receiving services in the 
institution, and is unlikely to ever 
be discharged from the institution 
and to return home]. 
Id. at § 1396p(a)(1).  The Act also contains an ―anti-
recovery‖ provision, which states that ―[n]o adjustment or 
recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under the State plan may be made, except [in 
limited circumstances not at issue in this case].‖  Id. at § 
1396p(b)(1). 
 To comply with the foregoing provisions of the Social 
Security Act, Pennsylvania has enacted 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 
1404(b), which provides that the ―acceptance of medical 
assistance benefits shall operate as an assignment to the 
[DPW], by operation of law, of the assistance recipient's 
rights to recover . . . payment for medical care from any third 
party.‖  Pennsylvania has also enacted 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 
1409, which governs third party liability in the context of 
Medicaid.  Under Section 1409, when Medicaid benefits are 
provided to a beneficiary because of an injury for which a 
third-party (including an insurer) is liable, both the DPW and 
the beneficiary may bring an independent cause of action 
7 
 
against the third-party.  If the DPW institutes suit, it has ―the 
right to recover from such person or insurer the reasonable 
value of benefits so provided.‖  Id. § 1409(b)(1).  If a 
beneficiary brings an action against a liable third party, the 
beneficiary may, if he so desires, ―include as part of his claim 
the amount of [Medicaid] benefits that have been or will be 
provided‖ by the DPW.  Id. § 1409(b)(5)(vi). 
If the beneficiary institutes an action against such a 
third party, the beneficiary must notify the DPW of the suit 
within thirty days, id. § 1409(b)(5), and the DPW may 
intervene in the suit at any time before trial, id. § 
1409(b)(5)(v).  However, the DPW is not required to 
intervene in a beneficiary‘s suit, and may instead wait until 
the suit has proceeded to a judgment or settlement.  In such 
cases, the resulting judgment or settlement must first be used 
to pay the reasonable litigation expenses and attorneys‘ fees 
incurred by the beneficiary.  Id. § 1409.1(b)(1).  Then, in 
cases that proceed to a judgment, ―the court or agency shall 
allocate the judgment or award between the medical portion 
and other damages,‖ and the DPW may assert a ―lien against 
the medical portion of the judgment or award,‖ in ―the 
amount of the expenditures for the benefit of the beneficiary‖ 
made by the DPW.  Id.
3
  In cases that settle, and which 
therefore lack a judicial allocation of damages, the DPW may 
impose a lien upon the settlement to recover its medical 
                                                          
 3 As the majority notes, see Slip Op. at 15 n.8, 
Pennsylvania enacted the judicial allocation provision in § 
1409.1 to comply with the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Ahlborn, which held that a state Medicaid agency may not 
seek ―payment for anything other than medical expenses.‖  
547 U.S. at 281. 
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expenditures in an amount not exceeding ―one-half of the 
beneficiary‘s recovery after deducting for attorney‘s fees, 
litigation costs, and medical expenses relating to the injury 
paid for by the beneficiary.‖  Id. § 1409(b)(11). 
B. 
The majority concludes that the various provisions of 
the Social Security Act set forth in the preceding section 
should be construed to permit state Medicaid agencies, such 
as the DPW, to impose liens on future judgments and 
settlements obtained by Medicaid beneficiaries from third 
parties.  The majority opinion derives much of its force from 
its argument that this construction prevents Medicaid 
recipients from obtaining windfall recoveries, because ―[i]t 
defies common sense to conclude that Congress intended to 
protect the rights of Medicaid beneficiaries to recover 
medical costs that they never paid in the first place.‖  Slip op. 
at 29. 
I disagree with the majority opinion‘s construction of 
the Social Security Act for three primary reasons.  First, the 
opinion ignores language in the reimbursement and 
assignment/cooperation provisions which indicates that 
Congress intended states to directly litigate claims against 
liable third parties.  Second, the opinion erroneously 
concludes that because Congress intended to create a limited 
implicit exception to the anti-recovery provision, this court 
must read an even broader implied exception into the anti-
recovery provision and an additional implied exception into 
the anti-lien provision.  Third, the opinion fails to recognize 
that § 1409(b)(5)(vi), which allows a Medicaid beneficiary to 
―include as part of his claim [against a third party] the amount 
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of benefits that have been or will be provided‖ by the DPW, 
is preempted by the Social Security Act. 
The last of these three reasons deserves particular 
emphasis: because § 1409(b)(5)(vi) is preempted by the plain 
language of the Social Security Act, Medicaid beneficiaries 
will not be able to obtain windfall recoveries.  As a result, it is 
not necessary to devise textually tenuous implicit exceptions 
in order to read the Act in a way that prevents such 
recoveries. 
1. 
Turning to the first reason, the District Court held that 
the reimbursement and assignment/cooperation provisions, 
taken together, indicate that Congress did not intend to permit 
state Medicaid agencies to free-ride on the efforts of plaintiffs 
by asserting liens after a judgment or settlement has been 
obtained.  Rather, Congress wanted states to either initiate 
suit against or intervene in actions against liable third parties, 
and wanted Medicaid recipients to cooperate in those efforts 
by providing state agencies with any information they might 
require.  As the District Court explained: 
Section 1396a(a)(25)(A)(i)-(ii) requires a state 
plan for medical assistance to take all 
reasonable measures to provide for ―the 
collection of sufficient information (as specified 
by the Secretary in regulations) to enable the 
State to pursue claims against ... third parties,‖ 
and to further provide for ―the submission to the 
Secretary of a plan (subject to approval by the 
Secretary) for pursuing claims against such 
third parties.‖  This statutory language 
10 
 
unambiguously refers to direct actions by state 
entities against liable third parties. Section 
1396a(a)(25)(B) requires a state to ―seek 
reimbursement‖ from liable third parties for the 
cost of medical assistance provided to an 
individual ―in any case where such a legal 
liability is found to exist after medical 
assistance has been made available on behalf of 
the individual and where the amount of 
reimbursement the State can reasonably expect 
to recover exceeds the cost of such recovery.‖  
The plain language of this statutory provision 
reveals that Congress believed that participating 
states would not only pursue liable third parties 
directly, but that they would also incur costs in 
seeking to recover their expenditures. 
Under § 1396k(a)(1)(C), a state plan for 
medical assistance must provide that, as a 
condition of eligibility for medical assistance, 
an ―individual is required . . . to cooperate with 
the State in identifying, and providing 
information to assist the State in pursuing, any 
third party who may be liable to pay for care 
and services available under the plan.‖  This 
statutory language indicates that Congress 
expected participating states to need assistance 
in pursuing liable third parties. The 
reimbursement provision contained in § 
1396k(b) likewise evinces a legislative intent 
that state entities directly pursue liable third 
parties. That provision requires a state entity 
which has collected money under an assignment 
11 
 
to retain only those proceeds necessary to 
reimburse it and the federal government for the 
cost of a given Medicaid recipient‘s medical 
care, and to pay the remainder of the money to 
the recipient. The reimbursement provision 
envisions an active role in litigation by state 
entities, not the passive role played by the DPW 
in the cases involving Tristani and Valenta. 
Tristani v. Richman, 609 F. Supp. 2d 423, 469 (W.D. Pa. 
2009) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
4
 
                                                          
4  I recognize that the construction of the Social 
Security Act defended in this opinion would, by requiring the 
DPW to litigate claims itself, render it cost-prohibitive for the 
DPW to pursue certain claims.  However, as the District 
Court noted, the reimbursement provision explicitly 
recognizes that there will be circumstances under which it 
will be too expensive for states to recover from third parties, 
and exempts states from any obligation to pursue claims in 
such circumstances.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (―in 
any case where such a legal liability is found to exist after 
medical assistance has been made available on behalf of the 
individual and where the amount of reimbursement the State 
can reasonably expect to recover exceeds the costs of such 
recovery, the State or local agency will seek reimbursement 
for such assistance to the extent of such legal liability‖ 
(emphasis added)). 
 
In addition, it should be noted that other public policy 
concerns aside from efficiency are at issue in this case, 
notably the attorney-client relationship.  Pursuant to § 
1409(b)(5)(vi), a plaintiff may pursue claims against third 
12 
 
                                                                                                                                  
parties for Medicaid expenditures made by the DPW.  If her 
case settles, then the DPW is entitled to recover its medical 
expenditures in an amount of up to one-half of the 
beneficiary‘s recovery after deducting for attorney‘s fees and 
litigation expenses, regardless of how a court would have 
actually allocated the plaintiff‘s medical and non-medical 
damages.  Id. § 1409(b)(11).  As a result of this essentially 
arbitrary default rule, a plaintiff whose medical damages were 
relatively small in comparison to her non-medical damages is 
likely to be under-compensated by the settlement (which was 
made in light of the risks that always attend going to trial), 
while the DPW will be over-compensated (because the DPW 
does not have to factor such risks into its recovery).  If the 
plaintiff wishes to challenge this default allocation, she must 
pursue a potentially expensive administrative appeal.  See 55 
Pa. Code § 259.2(d). 
 
The plaintiff‘s attorney, however, is in a quite different 
position.  Because the attorney‘s fees are deducted before the 
DPW takes its cut of the settlement, the attorney will always 
be fully compensated for her efforts.  Thus, under 
Pennsylvania‘s statutory scheme, the plaintiff‘s attorney has 
an incentive to include the plaintiff‘s Medicaid damages in 
the complaint—which is likely to increase the amount of time 
the attorney will spend on the case and therefore her fees—
even if that would not be advantageous for her client.  While I 
am confident that most attorneys in Pennsylvania would (like 
plaintiffs‘ counsel in this action) do what is in the best 
interests of their clients regardless of what is in their own best 
interests, I nonetheless suspect that Congress did not intend to 
create such temptations. 
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The majority opinion rejects the District Court‘s 
conclusion that states may only seek reimbursement for care 
and services provided by Medicaid by bringing their own 
lawsuits against third parties or by intervening in suits 
brought by Medicaid recipients, suggesting that § 
1396a(a)(25)(B) ―is silent regarding the method by which 
reimbursement must be sought‖ by the state.  Slip op. at 19–
20.  This statement is, in a strict sense, accurate: § 
1396a(a)(25)(B) does not itself specify whether the state must 
seek reimbursement directly from third parties. 
However, like the Supreme Court, ―[w]e do not . . . 
construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a 
whole.‖  United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984); 
see also United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (―A 
provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often 
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . .‖).  
The majority opinion does not quote or otherwise address the 
immediately preceding subsection, which indicates that 
Congress wanted ―the State to pursue claims against such 
third parties.‖  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (emphasis 
added).  The opinion also ignores § 1396k(a)(1)(C), which 
states that individuals must provide information ―to assist the 
State in pursuing‖ liable third parties.  And it does not address 
§ 1396k(b), which envisions that the state will seek 
reimbursement for medical assistance payments directly from 
a liable third party, and will pay any ―remainder‖ (i.e., 
amount recovered in excess of the state‘s medical 
expenditures) to the individual Medicaid recipient.
5
  Thus, the 
                                                          
5 This last provision is particularly noteworthy:  By 
providing for payment by the state Medicaid agency to the 
beneficiary of any remainder, § 1396k(b) indicates that 
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majority errs by ignoring language in the reimbursement and 
assignment/cooperation provisions indicating that Congress 
wants states to initiate or intervene in lawsuits against third 
parties. 
2. 
My second reason for disagreement with the majority 
opinion arises from its construction of the anti-lien and anti-
recovery provisions.  The District Court found that the anti-
lien and anti-recovery provisions can be rendered consistent 
with Section 1396a(a)(25), the reimbursement provision, and 
Section 1396k, the assignment/cooperation provision, by 
construing the latter provisions ―to require an assignment for 
the purpose of enabling a participating state to directly pursue 
claims against third parties liable for the costs of providing 
medical assistance to Medicaid recipients.‖  Tristani, 609 F. 
Supp. 2d at 470.  The majority opinion rejects this 
construction on the ground that ―the District Court‘s 
conclusion that Pennsylvania must intervene in tort actions 
filed by Medicaid beneficiaries cannot be reconciled with the 
anti-recovery provision‖ because ―[b]y its terms, the anti-
recovery provision limits the ability of states to recover 
medical assistance payments made on behalf of Medicaid 
beneficiaries, regardless of the specific method.‖  Slip op. at 
20. 
                                                                                                                                  
Congress was aware of the problem that a state‘s lawsuit 
against a liable third party might obtain an excessive 
recovery.  It is striking, then, that Congress did not include a 
similar provision to address the situation of excessive 
recovery by Medicaid beneficiaries. 
15 
 
I agree with the majority that the anti-recovery 
provision would, if read in isolation, seem to prohibit the state 
from using any method from seeking to recover medical 
assistance payments expended on behalf of Medicaid 
recipients.  From this, it follows that the reimbursement and 
assignment/cooperation provisions, which expressly state that 
states must pursue assigned claims directly against third 
parties, must constitute an implicit exception to the anti-
recovery provision permitting states to recover from liable 
third parties. 
However, it does not follow that the reimbursement 
and assignment/cooperation provisions create an exception to 
the anti-recovery provision permitting states to recover from 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  Nor does it follow that the 
reimbursement and assignment/cooperation provisions must 
be read to impliedly repeal the anti-lien provision.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(1) (―No lien may be imposed against the 
property of any individual . . . on account of medical 
assistance paid . . . under the State plan . . . .‖ (emphasis 
added)).
6
  Our precedents recognize that ―‗[r]epeals by 
implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless 
the intention of the legislature to repeal is clear and 
                                                          
 6 I agree with the District Court that, under the 
reasoning of Ahlborn, the liens imposed by the DPW upon 
beneficiaries‘ recoveries of Medicaid expenditures from third 
parties are ―imposed on their ‗property‘ for purposes of the 
anti-lien provision.‖  Tristani, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 472; see 
also id. (―[T]he mere fact that the DPW needed to assert liens 
in the first place indicates that the liens were imposed on the 
‗property‘ of [plaintiffs].‖); Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 286 (―Why, 
after all, would ADHS need a lien on its own property?‖). 
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manifest.‘‖  Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 154-55 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007)).
7
  Nowhere in the 
majority opinion‘s extended discussion of the various 
amendments to and the legislative history of the 
reimbursement and assignment/cooperation provisions does 
the majority point to any ―clear and manifest‖ Congressional 
intent to create an implicit exception to the anti-lien provision 
or to permit recoveries directly from Medicaid beneficiaries.
8
  
                                                          
 
7
 The earliest versions of the anti-lien and anti-
recovery provisions date to 1960, when they were first 
incorporated into the Social Security Act.  Slip op. at 22.  The 
earliest versions of the reimbursement and 
assignment/cooperation provisions were first enacted in 1967 
and 1977, respectively.  Id. at 26, 28.  As the majority 
recognizes, the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions have 
―undergone numerous amendments‖ clarifying and in some 
cases expanding the circumstances under which states may 
seek to recover from Medicaid beneficiaries.  Id. at 24 n.12.  
Despite these many amendments, Congress has never added 
an express exception to the anti-lien provision permitting 
state Medicaid agencies to impose liens upon judgments and 
settlements obtained by beneficiaries against third parties. 
 
 8 Indeed, the one piece of legislative history quoted by 
the majority—a statement by a single senator during a 
committee hearing—does not use the word ―lien‖ or 
otherwise suggest that recoveries may be made directly from 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  Slip op. at 27–28 (quoting Social 
Security Amendments of 1967: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
On Finance, 90th Cong. 1572 (1967) (statement of Wallace 
M. Smith)).  Far from evincing a clear intention to permit the 
17 
 
Such exceptions are not required by the language of the 
former provisions, which, as explained above, suggest on 
their face that Congress wanted states to directly initiate or 
intervene in lawsuits against third parties.  As the District 
Court recognized, the anti-lien provision can best be 
reconciled with the reimbursement and the 
assignment/cooperation provisions by construing the latter 
according to their plain meaning. 
In short, while a limited implied exception must be 
read into the anti-recovery provision to permit recoveries 
from liable third parties, that fact alone does not require—
much less justify—reading an even broader implied exception 
into the anti-recovery provision or an additional implied 
exception into the anti-lien provision.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the District Court‘s holding that ―[t]o the extent that 
sections 1409(b)(7)(i) and 1409.1(b)(1) permit the DPW to 
impose liens on the awards obtained by Medicaid recipients 
from liable third parties during the lifetimes of the recipients, 
they are preempted by § 1396p(a)(1) [the anti-lien 
provision].‖  Tristani, 609 F. Supp. at 473.  In addition, to the 
extent that sections 1409(b)(7)(i) and 1409.1(b)(1) permit the 
DPW to seek recoveries of ―medical assistance correctly 
paid‖ from Medicaid beneficiaries‘ settlements and 
                                                                                                                                  
use of liens by states agencies, the statement by Senator 
Smith evinces only a more general intent to reduce ―wasteful‖ 
double recoveries by beneficiaries—a goal accomplished by 
requiring states to initiate or intervene in suits against third 
parties.  Id. 
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judgments, rather than directly from third parties, they are 
preempted by § 1396p(b)(1), the anti-recovery provision.
9
 
3. 
 I would go a step further than the District Court, and 
also hold that § 1409(b)(5)(vi)—which permits a Medicaid 
beneficiary suing a third-party to ―include as part of his claim 
the amount of [Medicaid] benefits that have been or will be 
provided‖ by the DPW—conflicts with the Social Security 
Act and is therefore preempted.  As discussed above, the 
reimbursement and assignment/cooperation provisions 
indicate that Congress wanted state agencies to pursue claims 
                                                          
 9 The majority also notes that under traditional 
―common law principles, a partial assignment creates an 
equitable lien of favor of the assignee,‖ Angeles Real Estate 
Co. v. Kerxton, 737 F.2d 416, 419 (4th Cir. 1984), and 
therefore concludes that ―Congress understood that the legal 
effect of the [assignment/cooperation] provision would be to 
provide the states with a lien on recoveries of medical costs.‖  
Slip op. at 29–30.  The difficulty with relying on such 
common law principles when interpreting the Social Security 
Act is that the anti-lien provision expressly prohibits the 
imposition of liens against Medicaid beneficiaries for the 
recovery of medical expenditures, except in circumstances 
not present in this case.  See Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. 
Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 168 (2007) (noting, in the context of 
the Federal Employers‘ Liability Act (―FELA‖), that 
―although common-law principles are not necessarily 
dispositive of questions arising under FELA, unless they are 
expressly rejected in the text of the statute, they are entitled to 
great weight in our analysis‖ (internal quotation omitted) 
(emphasis added)). 
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against third parties for reimbursement of Medicaid 
expenditures, and imposed upon individual Medicaid 
recipients only the obligation that they cooperate with state 
agencies by providing them with any information necessary 
to pursue their claims.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A)(i) 
(requiring state plan to provide for ―the collection of 
sufficient information . . . to enable the State to pursue claims 
against ... third parties‖ (emphasis added)); id. § 
1396k(a)(1)(C) (requiring state plan to direct individuals to 
―cooperate with the State in identifying, and providing 
information to assist the State in pursuing, any third party 
who may be liable to pay for care and services available 
under the plan‖ (emphasis added)). 
The natural reading of these provisions is that 
Congress wanted the states, and the states alone, to be able to 
pursue claims against third parties for reimbursement of 
Medicaid expenditures.  Congress did not intend to authorize 
Medicaid recipients to include in their suits claims that 
properly belong to the states.  Such a reading of the Social 
Security Act would, because of the anti-lien and anti-recovery 
provisions discussed above, permit Medicaid recipients to 
obtain a windfall recovery—which, as the majority 
recognizes, is an absurd result that Congress cannot have 
intended.  Thus, I would hold that § 1409(b)(5)(vi) is also 
preempted by the third party liability provisions of the Social 
Security Act. 
 I come to this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that 
neither party to this litigation has argued that § 1409(b)(5)(vi) 
is preempted.  The parties‘ positions are perhaps unsurprising, 
because both have self-interested reasons for seeking to rely 
upon this provision of Pennsylvania law:  the plaintiffs hope 
to recover (or keep their recoveries of) Medicaid expenditures 
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from third parties, and then shield themselves from the DPW 
using the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions, while the 
DPW hopes to free-ride on the efforts of plaintiffs and their 
counsel in order to avoid the expenses of actually litigating 
claims against third parties.  The parties, of course, are 
entitled to their litigation positions, but the judiciary‘s duty is 
to ―say what the law is.‖  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  Because § 1409(b)(5)(vi) permits 
Medicaid recipients to assert claims belonging to the DPW, 
and is therefore the underlying source of the difficulties in 
this case, I would reach the question of whether it is 
preempted, and would answer that question in the affirmative. 
III. 
 The construction of the Social Security Act defended 
in this dissent remains faithful to the plain language of the 
Act, while also eliminating the possibility that Medicaid 
recipients will be able to obtain windfall recoveries.  For the 
reasons outlined above, I respectfully dissent. 
